fix(auth): recover refresh rotations and configure session lifetime

.env.example

@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ UPLOAD_ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS=
 PANEL_PUBLIC_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8088
 # Optional proxy networks. X-Forwarded-For is ignored unless the peer is in these CIDRs.
 TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS=
+# Absolute login lifetime (Go duration: 24h, 168h for 7 days). Applies to new logins.
+# Refresh does not extend this deadline. Invalid/non-positive values prevent startup.
+SESSION_TTL=24h
 # Trusted executable runtime build source. Do not embed credentials in this URL.
 DSH_RELEASE_REPOSITORY=https://git.misaka.ren/m1saka/dsh-web.git
 DSH_RELEASE_BRANCH=dockerfile

OPERATIONS.md

@@ -117,3 +117,12 @@ bash scripts/check-trial.sh
 该脚本执行本地自动化测试、race、静态检查及前后端构建，不启动容器、不安装依赖、不部署。需提前准备 Go/Node/npm 和前端依赖。可通过 `TEST_TMPDIR` 指定已存在的临时目录。面板构建单测已隔离真实磁盘空闲量；生产磁盘检查仍保留。`image/init-profile.test.mjs` 属于发布分支的 runtime 测试，不在 main 的检查脚本中运行。
 
 `scripts/test-panel.mjs` 必须指向独立测试部署，通过 `TEST_PANEL_URL`、`TEST_USERNAME`、`TEST_PASSWORD` 指定访问参数；`TEST_UPGRADE=1` 包含同镜像替换升级。运行前需由管理员通过 Git 发布构建准备已验证且准入的本地 runtime 镜像；可用 `TEST_FROM_VERSION` / `TEST_TO_VERSION` 选择源和目标版本。脚本不提交构建，只复用这些镜像，会创建及删除测试实例，删除时一并清理实例数据。不要对生产账号运行。`scripts/smoke-image.sh <image-id>` 和 `scripts/test-mobile-image.mjs <image-id>` 仅测试已有镜像的运行行为，不读取 main 的构建源；仅在隔离测试环境使用。旧构建脚本和构建后创建意图的 live 测试已删除。
+# Session lifetime
+
+Set `SESSION_TTL=24h` in `.env` (default), or `SESSION_TTL=168h` for seven days.
+Use Go duration units such as `h`, `m`, `s` (not `d`); the value must be a positive
+whole number of seconds. Recreate the panel container after changing it:
+`docker compose up -d --force-recreate panel`. New logins use the new lifetime;
+existing sessions retain their absolute expiry and refresh does not extend it.
+Access tokens remain valid for five minutes. `.env` is read by Docker Compose;
+when running the binary directly, export `SESSION_TTL` in its environment.

compose.yaml

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ services:
       HOST_DATA_ROOT: ${DSH_HOST_DATA_ROOT:?Set an absolute host data directory}
       PANEL_PUBLIC_URL: ${PANEL_PUBLIC_URL:-http://127.0.0.1:8088}
       TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS: ${TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS:-}
+      SESSION_TTL: ${SESSION_TTL:-24h}
       DSH_RELEASE_REPOSITORY: ${DSH_RELEASE_REPOSITORY:-https://git.misaka.ren/m1saka/dsh-web.git}
       DSH_RELEASE_BRANCH: ${DSH_RELEASE_BRANCH:-dockerfile}
       WEB_DIR: /app/web/dist

internal/api/AUTH_DESIGN.md

@@ -6,8 +6,17 @@
   session IDs never authenticate. Internal callers and test fixtures must also
   attach a signed access cookie.
 - Refresh is a random 256-bit HttpOnly cookie, scoped to `/api`, with only its
-  SHA-256 hash stored in SQLite. The session has a 24-hour absolute lifetime.
-  Conditional SQL update makes rotation single-use even across concurrent requests.
+  SHA-256 hash stored in SQLite. The session has an absolute lifetime configured
+  by SESSION_TTL (default 24h), applied only to new logins.
+  Session, refresh and CSRF cookies persist across browser restarts with explicit
+  Max-Age/Expires bounded by that database expiry; rotation does not extend it.
+  Transactional rotation stores current and previous token hashes. A keyed,
+  session-bound successor derivation makes retries of the previous token return
+  the same current token, including after response loss or server restart. Only
+  one previous generation is accepted (until the next rotation or session expiry);
+  this intentionally permits that generation to be replayed with the required
+  session/Origin/CSRF checks. Older and unknown tokens are rejected. Plaintext
+  refresh credentials are never stored.
   Logout deletes the database session and its refresh binding. Both refresh and
   logout retain mandatory exact Origin and session-bound CSRF checks, even when
   access has expired. Other operations require valid access.

internal/api/api.go

@@ -226,7 +226,11 @@ func (a *API) login(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		fail(w, 500, "session error")
 		return
 	}
-	a.authCookies(w, r, sid, u.ID, csrf, token)
+	if e = a.authCookies(w, r, sid, u.ID, csrf, token); e != nil {
+		a.s.DeleteSession(sid)
+		fail(w, 500, "session error")
+		return
+	}
 	a.s.AddAudit(u.ID, "login", u.ID, "")
 	writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"user": u, "csrf_token": csrf})
 }

internal/api/auth_tokens.go

@@ -63,9 +63,51 @@ func (a *API) initAuth() error {
 	}
 	_, err = a.s.DB.Exec(`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_refresh(sid TEXT PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES sessions(id) ON DELETE CASCADE, token_hash TEXT NOT NULL);
  CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_failures(username TEXT PRIMARY KEY, failures INTEGER NOT NULL, locked_until INTEGER NOT NULL);`)
+	if err == nil {
+		_, err = a.s.DB.Exec(`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_refresh_previous(sid TEXT PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES auth_refresh(sid) ON DELETE CASCADE, token_hash TEXT NOT NULL);`)
+	}
 	return err
 }
 
+// Derivation makes retries return the same successor without storing plaintext
+// credentials. Domain and session binding prevent cross-session token reuse.
+func (a *API) nextRefresh(sid, old string) string {
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, a.authKey)
+	mac.Write([]byte("refresh-successor\x00" + sid + "\x00" + old))
+	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
+}
+
+func (a *API) rotateRefresh(sid, old string) (string, error) {
+	tx, err := a.s.DB.Begin()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	defer tx.Rollback()
+	var current, previous string
+	err = tx.QueryRow(`SELECT r.token_hash, COALESCE(p.token_hash, '')
+ FROM auth_refresh r JOIN sessions s ON s.id=r.sid
+ LEFT JOIN auth_refresh_previous p ON p.sid=r.sid
+ WHERE r.sid=? AND s.expires>?`, sid, time.Now().Unix()).Scan(&current, &previous)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	hash := refreshHash(old)
+	next := a.nextRefresh(sid, old)
+	if hash == previous && refreshHash(next) == current {
+		return next, tx.Commit()
+	}
+	if hash != current {
+		return "", errAuthentication
+	}
+	if _, err = tx.Exec("UPDATE auth_refresh SET token_hash=? WHERE sid=?", refreshHash(next), sid); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	if _, err = tx.Exec("INSERT INTO auth_refresh_previous(sid,token_hash) VALUES(?,?) ON CONFLICT(sid) DO UPDATE SET token_hash=excluded.token_hash", sid, hash); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return next, tx.Commit()
+}
+
 type accessClaims struct {
 	Subject  string `json:"sub"`
 	Session  string `json:"sid"`
@@ -130,18 +172,34 @@ func (a *API) secureCookies(r *http.Request) bool {
 	}
 	return secure
 }
-func (a *API) authCookies(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, sid, uid, csrf, refresh string) {
+func (a *API) authCookies(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, sid, uid, csrf, refresh string) error {
+	// Persist recovery cookies across mobile browser process eviction, but never
+	// extend them beyond the database session's absolute expiry on refresh.
+	var expires int64
+	if err := a.s.DB.QueryRow("SELECT expires FROM sessions WHERE id=?", sid).Scan(&expires); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	now := time.Now()
+	remaining := int(expires - now.Unix())
+	if remaining <= 0 {
+		return errAuthentication
+	}
 	for _, c := range []*http.Cookie{
-		{Name: "dsh_session", Value: sid, Path: "/", HttpOnly: true},
+		{Name: "dsh_session", Value: sid, Path: "/", HttpOnly: true, MaxAge: remaining},
 		{Name: "dsh_access", Value: a.accessJWT(sid, uid, time.Now().Add(accessLifetime)), Path: "/", HttpOnly: true, MaxAge: int(accessLifetime.Seconds())},
-		{Name: "dsh_refresh", Value: refresh, Path: "/api", HttpOnly: true},
-		{Name: "dsh_csrf", Value: csrf, Path: "/"},
+		{Name: "dsh_refresh", Value: refresh, Path: "/api", HttpOnly: true, MaxAge: remaining},
+		{Name: "dsh_csrf", Value: csrf, Path: "/", MaxAge: remaining},
 	} {
+		c.Expires = time.Unix(expires, 0)
+		if c.Name == "dsh_access" {
+			c.Expires = now.Add(accessLifetime)
+		}
 		c.Secure = a.secureCookies(r)
 		c.SameSite = http.SameSiteLaxMode
 		http.SetCookie(w, c)
 	}
 	w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+	return nil
 }
 func (a *API) refresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
@@ -181,34 +239,19 @@ func (a *API) refresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		fail(w, 401, "authentication required")
 		return
 	}
-	token, err := refreshToken()
+	token, err := a.rotateRefresh(sid.Value, old.Value)
 	if err != nil {
-		fail(w, 500, "session error")
-		return
-	}
-	result, err := a.s.DB.Exec("UPDATE auth_refresh SET token_hash=? WHERE sid=? AND token_hash=? AND EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM sessions WHERE id=? AND expires>?)", refreshHash(token), sid.Value, refreshHash(old.Value), sid.Value, time.Now().Unix())
-	if err != nil {
-		fail(w, 500, "session error")
-		return
-	}
-	n, err := result.RowsAffected()
-	if err != nil {
-		fail(w, 500, "session error")
-		return
-	}
-	if n != 1 {
-		var active bool
-		err = a.s.DB.QueryRow("SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM sessions JOIN auth_refresh ON auth_refresh.sid=sessions.id WHERE sessions.id=? AND sessions.expires>?)", sid.Value, time.Now().Unix()).Scan(&active)
-		if err != nil {
-			fail(w, 500, "session error")
-		} else if active {
-			fail(w, 409, "refresh_conflict")
-		} else {
+		if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) || errors.Is(err, errAuthentication) {
 			fail(w, 401, "authentication required")
+		} else {
+			fail(w, 500, "session error")
 		}
 		return
 	}
-	a.authCookies(w, r, sid.Value, u.ID, csrf, token)
+	if err = a.authCookies(w, r, sid.Value, u.ID, csrf, token); err != nil {
+		fail(w, 500, "session error")
+		return
+	}
 	writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"user": u, "csrf_token": csrf})
 }
 func (a *API) accountLocked(username string) (bool, error) {

internal/api/auth_tokens_test.go

@@ -107,11 +107,11 @@ func TestAccessRefreshLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
 	if cookieValue(fresh, "dsh_refresh") == cookieValue(cs, "dsh_refresh") {
 		t.Fatal("not rotated")
 	}
-	if w = req("POST", "/api/refresh", "", csrf, cs); w.Code != 409 {
-		t.Fatal("replay accepted", w.Code)
+	if w = req("POST", "/api/refresh", "", csrf, cs); w.Code != 200 {
+		t.Fatal("retry rejected", w.Code)
 	}
-	if len(w.Result().Cookies()) != 0 || !strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), "refresh_conflict") {
-		t.Fatal("conflict must not issue credentials", w.Header(), w.Body.String())
+	if cookieValue(w.Result().Cookies(), "dsh_refresh") != cookieValue(fresh, "dsh_refresh") {
+		t.Fatal("retry must return the same successor")
 	}
 	if w = req("GET", "/api/me", "", "", fresh); w.Code != 200 {
 		t.Fatal(w.Code)
@@ -126,6 +126,72 @@ func TestAccessRefreshLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal("logout refresh valid")
 	}
 }
+func TestPersistentCookiesRecoverAfterBrowserRestart(t *testing.T) {
+	a, req := authFixture(t)
+	w := req("POST", "/api/login", `{"username":"alice","password":"password-123"}`, "", nil)
+	if w.Code != 200 {
+		t.Fatal(w.Code)
+	}
+	cookies := w.Result().Cookies()
+	sid := cookieValue(cookies, "dsh_session")
+	var expires int64
+	if err := a.s.DB.QueryRow("SELECT expires FROM sessions WHERE id=?", sid).Scan(&expires); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var restored []*http.Cookie
+	for _, c := range cookies {
+		if c.MaxAge <= 0 || c.Expires.IsZero() {
+			t.Fatalf("nonpersistent cookie: %s", c.Name)
+		}
+		if c.Name == "dsh_access" {
+			continue
+		} // Access has expired while backgrounded.
+		if c.Expires.Unix() != expires {
+			t.Fatalf("wrong expiry: %s", c.Name)
+		}
+		restored = append(restored, c)
+	}
+	if w = req("GET", "/api/me", "", "", restored); w.Code != 401 {
+		t.Fatal(w.Code)
+	}
+	// Simulate an older session without sleeping; rotation must not reset its TTL.
+	expires = time.Now().Add(time.Hour).Unix()
+	if _, err := a.s.DB.Exec("UPDATE sessions SET expires=? WHERE id=?", expires, sid); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	w = req("POST", "/api/refresh", "", cookieValue(restored, "dsh_csrf"), restored)
+	if w.Code != 200 {
+		t.Fatal(w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	fresh := w.Result().Cookies()
+	for _, c := range fresh {
+		if c.Name == "dsh_access" {
+			if c.MaxAge != int(accessLifetime.Seconds()) {
+				t.Fatal("access lifetime changed")
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+		if c.Expires.Unix() != expires || c.MaxAge <= 0 || c.MaxAge > 3600 {
+			t.Fatalf("session extended: %s", c.Name)
+		}
+	}
+	if w = req("GET", "/api/me", "", "", fresh); w.Code != 200 {
+		t.Fatal(w.Code)
+	}
+	w = req("POST", "/api/logout", "", cookieValue(fresh, "dsh_csrf"), fresh)
+	if w.Code != 200 {
+		t.Fatal(w.Code)
+	}
+	for _, c := range w.Result().Cookies() {
+		if c.MaxAge >= 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("cookie not cleared: %s", c.Name)
+		}
+	}
+	if w = req("GET", "/api/me", "", "", fresh); w.Code != 401 {
+		t.Fatal("revoked session accepted")
+	}
+}
+
 func TestAccountLockAndPersistentKey(t *testing.T) {
 	a, req := authFixture(t)
 	for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
@@ -198,7 +264,7 @@ func TestRefreshOriginConcurrentRotationAndJWTBinding(t *testing.T) {
 	for code := range codes {
 		counts[code]++
 	}
-	if counts[200] != 1 || counts[409] != 1 {
+	if counts[200] != 2 {
 		t.Fatal(counts)
 	}
 	b := New(a.s, a.root)

internal/api/refresh_recovery_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func TestRefreshLostResponseRecovery(t *testing.T) {
+	a, req := authFixture(t)
+	w := req("POST", "/api/login", `{"username":"alice","password":"password-123"}`, "", nil)
+	old := w.Result().Cookies()
+	csrf, sid := cookieValue(old, "dsh_csrf"), cookieValue(old, "dsh_session")
+	w = req("POST", "/api/refresh", "", csrf, old)
+	if w.Code != 200 {
+		t.Fatal(w.Code)
+	}
+	successor := cookieValue(w.Result().Cookies(), "dsh_refresh")
+	// Lose the response, expire access and restart the server: recovery is durable
+	// and does not depend on an active access cookie or a short grace timer.
+	for _, c := range old {
+		if c.Name == "dsh_access" {
+			c.Value = a.accessJWT(sid, "alice", time.Now().Add(-time.Hour))
+		}
+	}
+	b := New(a.s, a.root)
+	b.origin = a.origin
+	r := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/refresh", strings.NewReader(""))
+	r.Header.Set("Origin", a.origin)
+	r.Header.Set("X-CSRF-Token", csrf)
+	for _, c := range old {
+		r.AddCookie(c)
+	}
+	w = httptest.NewRecorder()
+	b.Handler().ServeHTTP(w, r)
+	if w.Code != 200 || cookieValue(w.Result().Cookies(), "dsh_refresh") != successor {
+		t.Fatal("lost response recovery failed", w.Code)
+	}
+	current := w.Result().Cookies()
+	w = req("POST", "/api/refresh", "", csrf, current)
+	if w.Code != 200 {
+		t.Fatal(w.Code)
+	}
+	if w = req("POST", "/api/refresh", "", csrf, old); w.Code != 401 || len(w.Result().Cookies()) != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("two-generation-old token accepted", w.Code)
+	}
+	bad := []*http.Cookie{{Name: "dsh_session", Value: sid}, {Name: "dsh_refresh", Value: "invalid"}}
+	if w = req("POST", "/api/refresh", "", csrf, bad); w.Code != 401 {
+		t.Fatal(w.Code)
+	}
+	if _, err := a.s.DB.Exec("UPDATE sessions SET expires=? WHERE id=?", time.Now().Unix(), sid); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if w = req("POST", "/api/refresh", "", csrf, current); w.Code == 200 || len(w.Result().Cookies()) != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("expired session recovered")
+	}
+}

internal/store/session_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func TestSessionTTL(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, value := range []string{"", "24h", "168h", "60s"} {
+		t.Run(value, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Setenv("SESSION_TTL", value)
+			s, err := Open(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "db"))
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			defer s.Close()
+			before := time.Now().Unix()
+			sid, _, err := s.Session("user")
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			var expiry int64
+			if err = s.DB.QueryRow("SELECT expires FROM sessions WHERE id=?", sid).Scan(&expiry); err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			ttl, _ := sessionLifetime(value)
+			if expiry < before+int64(ttl.Seconds()) || expiry > time.Now().Unix()+int64(ttl.Seconds()) {
+				t.Fatal(expiry)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+	for _, value := range []string{"0", "-1h", "7d", "bad", "500ms", "1.5s"} {
+		t.Run(value, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Setenv("SESSION_TTL", value)
+			if s, err := Open(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "db")); err == nil {
+				s.Close()
+				t.Fatal("invalid TTL accepted")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/store/store.go

@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@ import (
 	"crypto/rand"
 	"database/sql"
 	"encoding/hex"
+	"fmt"
 	_ "modernc.org/sqlite"
+	"os"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 )
@@ -27,12 +29,17 @@ type Instance struct {
 	Created     time.Time `json:"created_at"`
 }
 type Store struct {
-	DB        *sql.DB
-	closed    chan struct{}
-	closeOnce sync.Once
+	DB         *sql.DB
+	sessionTTL time.Duration
+	closed     chan struct{}
+	closeOnce  sync.Once
 }
 
 func Open(path string) (*Store, error) {
+	ttl, err := sessionLifetime(os.Getenv("SESSION_TTL"))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
 	db, e := sql.Open("sqlite", path)
 	if e != nil {
 		return nil, e
@@ -47,7 +54,18 @@ func Open(path string) (*Store, error) {
 		db.Close()
 		return nil, e
 	}
-	return &Store{DB: db, closed: make(chan struct{})}, nil
+	return &Store{DB: db, sessionTTL: ttl, closed: make(chan struct{})}, nil
+}
+
+func sessionLifetime(value string) (time.Duration, error) {
+	if value == "" {
+		return 24 * time.Hour, nil
+	}
+	ttl, err := time.ParseDuration(value)
+	if err != nil || ttl < time.Second || ttl%time.Second != 0 {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("SESSION_TTL must be a positive whole-second duration, e.g. 24h or 168h")
+	}
+	return ttl, nil
 }
 func (s *Store) Close()                { s.closeOnce.Do(func() { close(s.closed); s.DB.Close() }) }
 func (s *Store) Done() <-chan struct{} { return s.closed }
@@ -85,14 +103,14 @@ func (s *Store) Password(name string) (string, error) {
 }
 func (s *Store) Session(uid string) (string, string, error) {
 	id, csrf := ID(), ID()
-	_, e := s.DB.Exec("INSERT INTO sessions VALUES(?,?,?,?)", id, uid, csrf, time.Now().Add(24*time.Hour).Unix())
+	_, e := s.DB.Exec("INSERT INTO sessions VALUES(?,?,?,?)", id, uid, csrf, time.Now().Add(s.sessionTTL).Unix())
 	return id, csrf, e
 }
 func (s *Store) SessionUser(id string) (User, string, error) {
 	var uid, csrf string
 	var exp int64
 	e := s.DB.QueryRow("SELECT uid,csrf,expires FROM sessions WHERE id=?", id).Scan(&uid, &csrf, &exp)
-	if e != nil || exp < time.Now().Unix() {
+	if e != nil || exp <= time.Now().Unix() {
 		return User{}, "", sql.ErrNoRows
 	}
 	u, e := s.UserByID(uid)